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CHAMBERS v. OMAHA GIRLS CLUB,
INC.: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT OPENS
THE DOOR TO PREGNANCY BASED
DISCRIMINATION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)' was en-
acted in order to achieve equality in employment opportunities.2
The statute provides in pertinent part that it is unlawful for an
employer to "discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ., Specifi-
cally, in an employment sex discrimination action under Title VII,
the threshold question is whether the challenged behavior of the
42 US.C.A. §§ 2000e to e-17 (West 1981).
a See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977)
(seniority system perpetuating practice of employment discrimination against minority
members violated Title VII); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457-
58 (1975) (Title VII creates statutory rights against invidious discrimination in employ-
ment); see also C. J. ANTirAu, 2 Federal Civil Rights Acts - Civil Practice § 370, at 1-3 (2d
ed. 1980) (scope and purpose of Title VII).
Title VII is directed at the effects of employment practices and policies, not at their
motivation. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (act proscribes
practices "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."); Spurlock v. United Airlines,
Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218 (10th Cir. 1972) (Title VII aimed at consequences of employment
discrimination); see also C. J. ANTIEAu, supra, § 370, at 2 (Title VII concerned with conse-
quences of employment practices).
3 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 1981). "Title VII requires that there be equal em-
ployment opportunities available." See Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 529
(6th Cir.) (selection procedures heavily dependent on subjective evaluations violate Title
VII), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing purpose behind passage of Title VII).
The statute forbids not only blatant discrimination, but conduct which appears to be fair,
yet in effect, achieves a discriminatory result. See infra notes 45-47 and 52 which discuss
"disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" theories used to establish a Title VII viola-
tion. But cf. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (pro-
vision does not require employer to give preferential treatment to identified classes). See
generally Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualifcation, 55
TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1025 n.2 (1970) (extensive discussion of methodology behind disparate
impact and treatment analyses).
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employer was the result of a sex-based classification.' In General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,' the Supreme Court determined that distinc-
tions based on pregnancy are not sex-based classifications since the
class of non-pregnant persons includes both men and women.' In
response to this decision, and the resulting judicial confusion re-
garding the deprivation of pregnant womens' civil rights in the
labor force,7 Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
' See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715
(1983) (factual inquiry in Title VII case is whether intentional discrimination occurred (cit-
ing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). The central
inquiry in a Title VII sex suit is whether an employer is treating some people less favorably
than others because of their sex. See Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 69 (1st
Cir.) (plaintiff must show less favorable treatment based on sex to establish Title VII cause
of action), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun.
Employees v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846, 858 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
642-65 (11 th ed. 1985) (discussion of recent sex discrimination rulings interpreting Title
VII and enactment of PDA); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER, S. SHIFFRIN, THE AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTION: CASE - COMMENT - QuEsTIoNS 996-1015 (6th ed. 1986) (discussion of
historical treatment of gender-based discrimination).
" 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert, women employees of General Electric claimed that the
company's employee disability plan which excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from its
coverage discriminated on the basis of sex, and therefore violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 127-28.
6 Id. at 136 (distinguishing many circuit court decisions which required only rationally
supportable standards to satisfy equal protection). See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
519 F.2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975) (court held Title VII allows "no such 'rationality' test..
• ."), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 200 (3d
Cir. 1975) (court distinguished equal protection and Title VII cases), vacated on other
grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a)-(c) (1972) (provides
that pregnancy based discrimination is a prima facie violation of Title VII).
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court found that excluding pregnancy from a disability-benefits
plan did not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
at 135-36. Additionally, the Court noted "Geduldig is precisely in point in its holding that
an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not
a gender-based discrimination at all." Id. The Court determined that the concepts of dis-
crimination that had evolved in equal protection cases were sufficiently similar to become
the starting point of Title VII analysis. Id. at 133. But see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 233-38 (1976) (implying that there is no overlap between equal protection and Title
VII standards and analysis).
' See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 138-40 (1977) (court distinguished
Gilbert and found policy resulting in loss of job pay and seniority while on maternity leave
violative of Title VII); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974)
(school's mandatory termination of pregnant teachers violated due process clause);
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974) (California's disability insurance system
which covered temporarily disabled employees but excluded pregnancy disability did not
violate employees' equal protection). See generally Barkett, Pregnancy Discrimination-Purpose,
Effect, and Nashville Gas. Co. v. Satty, 16 J. FAM. L. 401 (1977-78) (discussion of caselaw
and its inherent inconsistencies interpreting pregnancy discrimination issues); Wald, Judi-
cial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII. Ignoring Congres-
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of 1978 (PDA) as an amendment to Title VII 6 Under the PDA, it
is a prima facie violation of Title VII for an employer to engage
sional Intent, 31 AM. UL. REV. 591, 596-98 (1982) (comparison of lower court decisions
employing equal protection analysis); Note, Employment Discrimination-Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Against Male Employees: Extending the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to Employees' Depen-
dents, 61 N.C.L. REV. 733, 734 (1983) (lack of clarity existing among circuits led to confu-
sion among lower courts); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the
Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 448-56 (1975) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Geduldig v. Aiello] (review of caselaw interpretations of pregnancy-based discrimina-
tion within sex discrimination analysis leading to inconsistent results); Comment, The 1978
Amendment to Title VII: The Legislative Reaction to the Geduldig-Gilbert-Satty Pregnancy Exclu-
sion Problems In Disability Benefit Programs, 27 Loy. L. REV. 532, 534-35 (1981) [hereinafter
Comment, Pregnancy Exclusion Problems] (discussion of dissatisfaction with caselaw leading
to passage of PDA).
The statutory language and the legislative history of the PDA indicate that it was en-
acted expressly to overrule the Supreme Court decision in Gilbert so that any discrimina-
tion based on pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West
1981). See also H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4750-51 ("It is the committee's view that the dissenting Jus-
tices [in Gilbert] correctly interpreted the Act."); S. REP'. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1977) ("Gilbert decision threatens to undermine the central purpose of the sex discrimina-
tion prohibitions of Title VII.").
I See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West 1981). The amendment provides in pertinent part
that:
[tihe terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work ....
Id. In other words, discrimination based on pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination. Id.
The PDA is a clarification of the original intent of Title VII, not a supplement. See HR.
REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4749, 4751-52. Thus, under the PDA, it is statutorily mandated that pregnant women be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work. See id.
See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West 1981); Note, Title VII and Exclusionary Employment
Practices: Fertile and Pregnant Women Need Not Apply, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 95, 97-100 (1985)
(detailed analysis of provisions of the Amendment).
Unfortunately, the amendment has not been interpreted consistently by the courts, and
therefore confusion still exists in this area of the law. Compare Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (upholding airline policy requiring
grounding of flight attendants between 13th and 28th week of pregnancy, regardless of
competence), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) and Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding airline policy requiring grounding of
flight attendants upon knowledge of pregnancy) with Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry-
dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 450-51 (4th Cir. 1982) (requiring that medical plan
covering dependents of employees include disabilities due to pregnancy) and EEOC v.
Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (failure to provide benefits
for pregnancy disability violated Title VII), affd in part rev'd in part, 727 F.2d 566 (6th
Cir. 1984). See generally Note, The 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act: A Problem of Interpreta-
tion, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 607, 609-11 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Interpretation] (identifies diffi-
culty lower courts face interpreting PDA).
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in employment practices which discriminate "on the basis of preg-
nancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions."'
A Title VII sex discrimination action may be based on one of
two theories: "disparate treatment"10 or "disparate impact."'"
Courts, however, have struggled in determining which standard
should apply to discrimination against pregnant working women.1
Recently, in Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc.," the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit held that the employer's challenged
business practice, specifically, the "role model rule,"" did not vio-
late Title VII under the disparate impact or disparate treatment
theories since it was justified by a business necessity. Moreover,
it was upheld as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).'
In Chambers,'7 a black unmarried woman was employed by the
Omaha Girls Club (Club), a private social club established for the
purpose of offering young girls guidance and opportunities in
reaching their goals.1 8 As a staff member, Chambers was trained
' See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West 1981); supra note 8 (discusses purpose and intent of
PDA). The Senate Report states that the employer should look not to the condition of
pregnancy, but to the woman's ability to perform her job while pregnant. S. REP. No. 33 1,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977). Those who can still perform their jobs should be treated
equally. Id.
"0 See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussion of "disparate treatment"
theory).
" See infra note 52 and accompanying text (discussion of "disparate impact" theory).
" See, e.g., Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 803 F.2d 1322,
1328 (4th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs in Title VII sex discrimination action prevailed on theories
of both disparate treatment and disparate impact); Spaulding v. University of Washington,
740 F.2d 686, 700-02 (9th Cir.) (plaintiffs failed to prove violation of Title VII on dispa-
rate treatment and disparate impact grounds), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Hayes v.
Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553-54 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (although possibly no
liability under disparate treatment theory, Title VII violation established on basis of dispa-
rate impact).
The disparate treatment approach and disparate impact approach to Title VII violations
are not to be treated as separate claims for relief but as alternate grounds for recovery. See
Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Page v.
United States Indust., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1984) (if facts allow, dispa-
rate treatment and impact theories may both be applied in analysis); Davis, 803 F.2d at
1327 (not mandatory that plaintiff elect disparate impact theory in pleading).
834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
14 See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (role model policy discussed).
" See Chambers, 834 F.2d at 702. See also infra note 53 and accompanying text (discusses
business necessity defense).
" See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discusses BFOQ justification).
17 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
18 Id. at 698.
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and expected to act as a role model for the girls."' Upon becom-
ing pregnant, Chambers was notified that she would be fired due
to her condition, pursuant to the Club's "role model rule" em-
ployment policy" which prohibited the continued employment of
single staff members who either became pregnant or caused preg-
nancy."1 In addition to several other claims,"3 Chambers brought a
Title VII sex discrimination claim against the Club, challenging its
employment practices.23 The district court examined the Title
VII claim, incorporating both the disparate impact and disparate
treatment analyses.'4 The court employed the McDonnell Douglas
shifting of burdens approach with respect to the disparate treat-
ment prong of the Title VII analysis.'5 Upon finding that Cham-
bers had made out a prima facie case of intentional discrimina-
tion,"6 the district court shifted the burden of production to the
" Id. at 699. Chambers was employed as an arts and crafts instructor at the Club. Id.
o Id. The notice of termination occurred approximately three months after the role
model policy was announced. Id.
Id. The policy was enacted pursuant to the Club's belief that in serving an all female
population, the close relationships associated with the high staff to member ratio required
commitment to the Club's philosophies. Id. The Club maintained that the programs di-
rected toward pregnancy prevention were premised upon the expectation that the girls
would emulate the behavior of the staff. Id. Consequently, the Club feared that the contin-
ued employment of a single parent would frustrate the program's objectives. Brief for Ap-
pellees at xxi, Chambers (No. 86-1447).
" Chambers, 834 F.2d at 629. Chambers brought claims against the Club under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (dismissed for lack of requisite state action); against the Nebraska Equal
Opportunity Commission (dismissed pursuant to defense of absolute immunity); against
Governor Thone and Attorney General Paul Douglas (dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action); against the Omaha World Herald under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and under state
conspiracy charges (dismissed for failure to show conspiratorial agreement); constitutional
claims under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments (dismissed for lack
of requisite state action); against the Club under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and under state con-
spiracy claims (resulted in directed verdict against Chambers for failure to produce evi-
dence that the Club was part of conspiratorial agreement); and against the Club under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (dismissed for failure to show racial animus).
" Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 929 (D. Neb. 1986). The Title VII
action was the only claim to survive to trial level. Id. at 943. Chambers alleged that "black
single women" make up the class which was disproportionately affected by the rule. Id. at
944. The district court accepted the combination pleading (race/sex), pursuant to its adop-
tion of the Fifth Circuit holding in Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615
F.2d 1025, 1032-34 (5th Cir. 1980) which found there was a congressional intent that Title
VII protection may be addressed toward black women as a separate class. Id. at 944 n.34.
" Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 945. See also infra notes 47 and 52 and accompanying text
(discussing disparate impact and disparate treatment approaches).
"' Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 945. See also infra note 27, 45, and 47 and accompanying
text (further discussing the burden of persuasion and production in Title VII cases).
" Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 947. Chambers identified herself as a member of a Title VII
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Club which asserted that the role model rule served a legitimate
purpose in attempting to discourage teenage pregnancy."7 The
court further found that Chambers failed to establish that a
pretextual motive existed for the Club's policy, thereby failing to
meet her burden of establishing intentional discrimination."
The district court then examined Chamber's claim under the
disparate impact analysis." The court found that Chambers estab-
lished a prima face case of disparate impact under the Green for-
mulation traditionally associated with this analysis." However, the
Club succeeded in showing that the role model policy bore a man-
ifest relationship to the Club's fundamental purpose, thereby es-
tablishing the existence of a BFOQ.31 The court further held that
Chambers failed to rebut the Club's evidence of a BFOQ by way
of illustration of a pretextual motive on the part of the Club."
protected class (black); established her qualification for the job, her discharge occurred
solely based on her pregnancy and her replacement by a single non-pregnant black woman.
Id. See, e.g., Zuniga v. Kleburg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1982) (preg-
nancy discrimination is prima facie violation of Title VII § 2000e(k)).
27 Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 947. The Club had established its purpose as necessarily
incorporating a "bonding" process between its members and the staff whereby the coun-
selor became a confidant and friend. See Brief for Appellees at xix, Chambers (No. 86-
1447). See also supra note 19 and accompanying text (staff member expected to be role
model).
The shifting of the burden of production is the second step within the McDonnell Douglas
framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (burden
shifts upon showing of purposeful discrimination); accord Texas Dep't of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) (shifting burden standard function at com-
mon law).
" Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 947-48. Despite Chambers assertion of pretextual motiva-
tion by the Club, the Club rebutted the evidence. Brief for Appellees at 2, Chambers (No.
86-1447).
" Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 948. See also infra note 30 and 52 and accompanying text
(discussing elements required to be shown for a cause of action under disparate impact).
3' Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 948. Chambers established a case of disparate impact under
the first method enunciated in Green, i.e., "that black females of child-bearing age would
be excluded from employment under the policy at a higher rate than white females be-
cause of their significantly higher fertility rate." Brief for Appellees at 4, Chambers (No. 86-
1447). See also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
0' Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 949-50. See also supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text
(further discussion of BFOQ).
0 Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 950-51. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing "pretext" theory).
The trial court was unpersuaded that less discriminatory alternatives were available. See
Chambers, 834 F.2d at 702-03. Chambers suggested a "leave of absence" or a different
position within the organization that would isolate her from contact with the members. Id.
at 702. The Club responded that a leave would have to be "five to six months" and that a
temporary replacement would take that long to locate and train. Id. at 702-03. Addition-
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed the district
court's holding upon application of the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard of review. 8' The court of appeals found both the disparate
impact and treatment analyses employed by the lower court sub-
stantiated, notwithstanding the asserted lack of validation of the
purported effectiveness of the Club's role model rule." However,
in a dissenting opinion, Justice McMillian proposed that the ma-
jority's decision was contrary to Title VII and that Chambers had
proved discrimination due to her pregnancy under the disparate
treatment theory.8 '
It is submitted that given the lack of objective evidence before
it, the court of appeals erred in finding a valid BFOQ justification
under the disparate treatment analysis and in finding a valid busi-
ness necessity defense under the disparate impact analysis. It is
further submitted that the court erred in its application of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas analysis where it found that per se discrimination
existed on the facts of the case, and therefore, the discussion of
pretext was misplaced. This Comment will address the major is-
sues within the pregnancy discrimination area as well as provide a
critical analysis of the court's role as policy maker. Part one will
examine the legislative history of the PDA and its subsequent ap-
plication to a civil rights claim in an effort to discern its proper
ally, the Club asserted that temporary counselors would interfere with relation-building
between the staff and its members and that no positions existed which would isolate Cham-
bers from the members. Id. at 703. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977) (plaintiff may assert employer is discriminating by exhibiting alternatives that do not
discriminate while simultaneously fulfilling employer's original motive); Blake v. City of
Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1979) (less discriminatory alternatives re-
duce value of business necessity defense), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); Ellison v. Best
Foods, 598 F. Supp. 159, 162 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (plaintiff may rebut existence of business
necessity by showing other employment practices which lack similar discriminatory effect
would satisfy employer's goals).
", Chambers, 834 F.2d at 702. See FEn. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The statute states in part that
"[fqindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ..... Id.
" Chambers, 834 F.2d at 703, 705. The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the absence of
validation studies typically associated with Title VII claims was not fatal to a finding of a
business defense or BFOQ. Id. at 702. In so holding, the Chambers court relied on Hawkins
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 816 (8th Cir. 1983) which stated, "we cannot say
that validation studies are always required ... " Id. Compare Davis v. Dallas, 777 F.2d 205
(5th Cir. 1985) (validation not necessarily required to establish effectiveness of given policy)
with Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1978) (whether
validation is necessary largely depends on policy involved).
" Chambers, 834 F.2d at 705 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
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function within Title VII.31 Part two will address the judicial anal-
ysis in Chambers and suggest that the court went beyond the realm
of the evidence, beyond a resolution between the parties them-
selves and into a dimension of decision-making affecting society as
a whole.3 7 Additionally, part two will address the ramifications of
the Chambers decision in light of the appropriateness of an active
judiciary."
I. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
A. Legislative History of the PDA
"The decision of the United States Supreme Court in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert provided the immediate impetus for the pas-
sage of the PDA." ' In that case, the Court concluded that there
was no violation of Title VII sex discrimination where an em-
ployer excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from an employee
disability plan. 0 A review of the statutory language and the legis-
lative history of the PDA indicates that it was enacted to fulfill
two essential purposes: first, to specifically overrule Gilbert; and
second, to prevent the differential treatment of women in all as-
pects of employment based on the condition of pregnancy."'
" See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing passage of PDA and its rela-
tionship to Title VII).
" See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing Chambers).
See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of a policy-
oriented decision).
Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J.
929, 930 (1985). For an examination of the caselaw leading to the passage of the PDA, see
Wald, supra note 7, at 592-98.
Prior to 1976, all of the federal courts that addressed pregnancy discrimination held that
it qualified as sex discrimination under Title VII See, e.g., Communications Workers v. AT
& T, 513 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1975) (Title VII prohibits differential treatment of
pregnancy related disabilities); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961, 965
(9th Cir. 1975) (employer violated Title VII when pregnant employees were refused sick
leave benefits); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 854-55 (6th Cir. 1975) (sick leave
and seniority programs violated Title VII); Farkas v. Southwestern City School Dist., 506
F.2d 1400, 1402 (6th Cir. 1974) (same).
40 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1976). See supra note 39 for dis-
cussion of federal court decisions contrary to this case.
" California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691-92 (1987). The
PDA's language and legislative history indicates that the purpose of the amendment is to
avoid discriminatory treatment based on pregnancy. Id. See also Newport News Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-79 (1983) ("[t]he PDA has now made
clear that for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on women's pregnancy is, on its
204
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A review of the statements made by House and Senate members
during the debates surrounding the enactment of the PDA reveals
consideration of the impact of the PDA, with an orientation to-
ward the role of women in today's workforce.42 Therefore, it was
Congress' intent to reject stereotypical notions of women in an
effort to establish recognition of "the full participation of women
face, discrimination because of her sex"); Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d
643, 646 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussion of legislative intent to overrule Gilbert and prevent
differential treatment of women in all aspects of employment); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial
Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1546-47 (11 th Cir. 1984) (same); Zuniga V. Kleburg County Hosp.,
692 F.2d 986, 989 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Ponton v. Newport News School Bd., 632 F.
Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1986) (purpose to treat women in labor force equally). See
generally Thomas, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employee Disability Benefit Programs:
Title VII and Equal Protection Clause Analysis, 60 OR. L. REV. 249, 263-64 (1981) (purpose of
amendment indicated by sponsor in the Senate, Sen. Williams ("[W]e are saying that the
definition of sex discrimination will cover pregnancy discrimination")); Wald, supra note 7,
at 599 (amendment intended to fulfill two basic purposes); Note, Employment Discrimination-
Wright v. Olin Corp.: Title VII and the Exclusion of Women From the Fetally Toxic Workplace,
62 N.C.L. REV. 1068, 1072 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Wright v. Olin Corp.].
Noteworthy is the House Report issued by the Subcommittee on Employment Opportu-
nities of the Committee on Education and Labor which suggests that the PDA mandates
only equality of treatment of pregnant women in the workplace. See H.R. REP. No. 948,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749,
4754. Thus, the effect of the PDA was not to elevate sex to a level of primary considera-
tion as a factor in employment. See Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446, 451 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Title VII designed to eliminate sex as a factor in employment). But see Guerra, 107 S. Ct.
at 692 (PDA does not prohibit preferential treatment of pregnant women).
Additionally, the House Report would seem to limit the PDA's scope to the discrimina-
tory impact upon the pregnant woman herself. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4753. "At the same time, the
bill is intended to be limited to effects upon the woman who is herself pregnant ...." Id.
See generally 123 CONG. REC. 29, 645 (1977) (statements of PDA proponents); infra notes 42-
43 and accompanying text.
" See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-63 thereinafter LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY] at 61-63 (Sen. Williams). Sen. Williams stated the importance of giving preg-
nant women protection against employment discrimination as necessary "for their financial
security ...." Id. See also id. at 29-30 (Sen. Cranston) (repeating same sentiment); Id. at 25-
26, 166-67 (Rep. Hawkins) (stressing that without enactment of bill, invidious discrimina-
tion and lifetime impact of discrimination would likely destroy women's well being). See
generally Legislation to Prohibit Sex on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055 and H.R.
6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-17, 43-45, 64 (1977) (discussion of outmoded view of mandatory
leave from employment for pregnant women and progress in eliminating pregnancy dis-
crimination); Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human
Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 113-15, 122-23, 232-33 (1970) (statements of Wendy Wil-
liams, Lawrence Gold, and David Fitzmaurice, leading proponents of legislation to prohibit
pregnancy-based discrimination on history of employment discrimination and impact of Ti-
tle VII).
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in our economic system."48
B. Alternative Analytical Approaches to the PDA
In the case of Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital," the court es-
tablished a legal framework which set forth three theories of anal-
ysis relating to a sex discrimination claim under Title VII.'" The
first situation in which a Title VII action may be applied is when
" See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 61. Statements made by a sponsor of the
PDA reveal that most types of employment discrimination resulted from employers' atti-
tudes about pregnancy and their fear of losing their workforce because of pregnancy. Id.
See also Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969)
(congressional purpose to eliminate assumptions and traditional stereotypical conceptions
of women's ability to do particular work); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,
717 (7th Cir. 1969) (same).
Since the crux of gender stereotyping involves the presumption that women will leave
their jobs due to pregnancy, resulting in discrimination of such women, it is clear that
there is an urgent need that Title VII address this precise type of discrimination. See LEGIs-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42. See also Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (employment decisions cannot be predicated on myth or stereo-
typed assumptions of male or female characteristics); Woody v. West Miami, 477 F. Supp.
1073, 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (Title VII prohibits stereotypical culturally-based concepts of
ability to perform certain tasks because of sex).
Additionally, the Senate Report stresses that "perhaps the most important effect of [the
PDA is to prohibit employer policies forcing] women who become pregnant to stop work-
ing regardless of their ability to continue ..... Id. at 6, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY,
supra note 42, at 43.
As the Supreme Court has succinctly stated, "[t]he reports, debates and hearings make
abundantly clear that Congress intended the PDA to provide relief for working women
and to end discrimination against pregnant workers." See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987), quoted in Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d
643, 647 (8th Cir. 1987).
" 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
4 Sete Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984). The
three theories discussed by the court included "facial" discrimination, "pretext" discrimi-
nation and "disparate impact" cases. Id. See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (ultimate burden of persuading trier of fact of intentional
discrimination remains with plaintiff); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973) (Supreme Court "blueprint" for prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (unlawful discrimination can be
analyzed under theory of adverse impact); infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (in-
depth discussion of each theory). But see Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc., 780 F.2d
987, 990-91 (1 1th Cir. 1986). "Although these theories provide a framework under which
the burdens of persuasion and production can be neatly delegated to the relevant parties,
they will not fit every case and were never meant to obscure the fact that the ultimate
finding is whether unlawful discrimination occurred." Id. at 990. See generally Wald, supra
note 7, at 606-11 (alternative approach in analyzing pregnancy discrimination cause of ac-
tion, viewing action as class-based discrimination akin to "classifications based on sex, reli-
gion, or national origin").
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an employer has engaged in "facial discrimination.""' This occurs
when one group of employees is treated in a prejudicial manner;
clearly discriminated against "on the basis of race, religion, na-
tional origin, or gender (pregnancy)." '47 To rebut a showing of fa-
cial discrimination, an employer's sole defense is to show the exis-
tence of a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)." An
" See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548; supra note 26 and accompanying text (definition, discus-
sion and examples of facial discrimination). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONs-rrru-
TIONAL LAW § 16-14 (1978) (discussion of "facially invidious discrimination" as applied to
race and especially Indian tribes).
47 See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547. "[A] presumption (is established] that if the employer's
policy by its terms applies only to women or pregnant women, then the policy is facially
discriminatory." Id. at 1548. See also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983) ("for all Title VII purposes discrimination based on a
woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex"); International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) ("disparate treatment"
theory applied in racial discrimination case where employer treated some people less favor-
ably than others based on race alone); Ponton v. Newport News School Bd., 632 F. Supp.
1056, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1986) ("clear that... plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis
of her pregnancy, for plaintiff would not have been forced to take the leave of absence if
she had not become pregnant").
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the stat-
ute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifi-
cations he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (1973). This method of allocating the burden of
production has been adapted to discharge cases. See, e.g., Davis v. Lambert of Ark., Inc.,
781 F.2d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 1986) (court followed disparate treatment theory and frame-
work); Worthy v. United States Steel Corp., 616 F.2d 698, 701 (3d Cir. 1980) (court em-
ployed appropriate framework for plaintiff to make prima facie case of facial discrimina-
tion). But see King v. Yellow Freight Sys., 523 F.2d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 1975) (appro-
priateness of allocation of burdens doubtful in a discharge case).
Given the aforementioned analysis, the most essential element of the cause of action for
facial discrimination is proof of discriminatory motive. See International Bhd. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 335 n.15. See also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (burden of showing intentional discrimination remains with plaintiff);
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (ultimately,
plaintiff held to "preponderance of the evidence" standard for showing intentional dis-
crimination); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
(court held "proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause").
"8 See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. An employer is expected
"to rebut the presumption of discrimination" by showing that there was a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" for rejecting the employee. Id. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
411 U.S. at 802 (same; further stating that pretext for employer's justification is subjective,
not objective); East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant's
burden must include comparative evidence showing hired employee more qualified than
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employer who establishes that religion, sex or national origin is a
"qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operations of
that particular business or enterprise," has established a BFOQ
within the meaning of Title VII."
one let go or not hired). The BFOQ defense is articulated at 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-2(e)(l)
(West 1981) and provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to employ an individual "on the basis of his religion, sex or national origin in those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a [BFOQJ reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business or enterprise ..... Id.
While the legislative history of the BFOQ provision indicates its intended broad applica-
tion of the defense, both the EEOC and courts have established a tradition of limited appli-
cation. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(aX2)
(1987) (only BFOQ explicitly allowed for third-party preferences relating to "genuine-
ness," e.g., actor or actress employment).
The EEOC guidelines are interpretive in nature and bind only the Commission. See Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (guidelines lack force of law). But
see Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (guidelines entitled to great defer-
ence except where inconsistent with congressional intent); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (same). The Court in Griggs examined BFOQ impact on racially
discriminatory pre-employment testing wherein the court stated that "[s]ince the Act and
its legislative history support the Commission's construction, this affords good reason to
treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress." Id. at 434. See also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S, 321, 334 n.19 (1977) (EEOC had "adhered to a position of a narrow
construction of the BFOQ consistently, and this construction given great deference"); In re
Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir.
1978) (extremely narrow construction held most appropriate), rev'd sub nom. Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d
1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusal to allow cultural stereotypes to be justification for sex
based discrimination). See generally Sirota, supra note 3, at 1027-33 (Congress intended
BFOQ provision specifically pertaining to sex as broad justification for sex discrimination).
It can be noted, however, that in recent years the Supreme Court has rejected the "great
deference" standard in favor of the weaker "entitled to consideration" standard enunci-
ated in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976). See, e.g., International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325 (1977) (court rejected EEOC guide-
lines on bona fide seniority systems); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976)
(court rejected EEOC guidelines on employment selection procedures). See generally
Portwood & Koziara, In Search of Equal Employment Opportunity: New Interpretations of Title
VII, 30 LAB. L.J. 353, 354 (1979) (notes that "EEOC interpretations of Title VII require-
ments have implicit judicial approval").
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970), quoted in Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547. See also Knott v.
Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975) (burden on employer to
show BFOQ reasonably necessary to operation of business to justify discriminatory pur-
pose); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969) (equal
footing is intent of Title VII; BFOQ established if employees otherwise available for posi-
tion disqualified upon showing of individual incapacity, whether male or female); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969) (same).
The federal courts have applied a virtually uniform analysis of the requirements of a
BFOQ. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (employer
did not satisfy burden of establishing factual basis for believing all, or substantially all,
women unable to safely and efficiently perform duties of job); Diaz v. Pan Am World Air-
ways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) ("discrimination [held] valid when essence of the business
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Another related situation in which a cause of action on sex dis-
crimination in employment may arise is when an employer adopts
an essentially neutral facial policy, but upon further examination
it is alleged to be a mere "pretext" for forbidden discrimination.0
Together, the "facial discrimination" theory and the "pretext"
theory are referred to as "disparate treatment cases. ' '6
operation would be undermined .... ") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971); Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971) (BFOQ based on characterization of
women as "weaker sex" held invalid and violative of statute).
The defendant's burden of production requires that the employer establish rationaliza-
tions which are "clear and reasonably specific." See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. Cf. Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011-12 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1979) (employer's burden to articu-
late legitimate reason held not a burden to persuade trier motivation by that reason but, a
burden to state a valid reason, to which plaintiff will assert, is merely a "pretext").
50 See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547. The pretext theory is set forth in Burdine, 450 U.S. at
253-56 (1980). Where the defendant has articulated "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employees' rejection . . . the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the de-
fendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. at 253 (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)). See also Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982) (even if defendant makes showing of significant business
purpose for its alleged discrimination, plaintiff may show that proposed discriminatory rea-
sons are pretextual); United States v. Cicero, Ltd., 786 F.2d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 1986)
(plaintiff succeeded in proving illegal discrimination); Jones v. Cassens Transp., 617 F.
Supp. 869, 893 (D.C. Mich. 1985) (court found clearly pretextual reasons of employer did
not constitute legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale in treating women workers).
The plaintiffls ultimate burden of persuasion may be established in one of two ways, i.e.,
"'directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason.., motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of cre-
dence.' " Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, quoted in Beatty v. Chesapeake Center, Inc., 818 F.2d
318, 321 (4th Cir. 1987). See also Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 (Court noted even if employer
demonstrates his practice was significantly related to job, employee may still prevail if it is
shown that practice was being used as mere pretext for discrimination); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (court held plaintiff can show less discriminatory alternatives
that employer could use to serve his purpose); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 425 (1975) (such showing of other alternatives with less discriminatory effect indicates
employer's use of pretext for discrimination); Zuniga v. Kleburg County Hosp., 692 F.2d
986, 988 (5th Cir. 1982) (court found termination of x-ray technician was based on valid
business purpose that was not pretextual); Ponton v. Newport News School Bd., 622 F.
Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1986) (court found pretextual rationalization). See generally L.
TmrBE, supra note 46, at 1073 (discussing "burden of exploration" required of employer).
" See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547. Disparate treatment cases are analyzed differently than
impact cases, yet both are applicable to a violation of the PDA. Id. Additionally, it is not
uncommon for the same set of facts to give rise to both types of theories. Id. See also
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983) (recog-
nized distinction between treatment and impact cases within Title VII analyses); Maddox v.
Grandview Care Center, Inc., 780 F.2d 987, 989-90 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (analysis under treat-
ment theory although opinion noted availability of impact theory). See generally Bartholet,
Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 951 (1982) (discussion of
differences in disparate treatment cases and disparate impact cases); Lopatka, 1977 Primer
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The third situation for an employment sex discrimination ac-
tion applies when an "employee concedes that the employer's pol-
icy is neutral," but claims that the policy creates a "disparate
impact" on a group protected from discrimination under Title
VII. 2 An employment practice which has such an adverse impact
upon a protected group is "invalid unless the employer can prove
that the challenged practice is justified by a business necessity."'"3
on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL L. REV. 69, 74 (1977)
(distinguished the examination of disparate impact analysis from treatment analysis).
" See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1547. The disparate impact theory is enunciated in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The plaintiff must demonstrate a facially neu-
tral employment practice operates to effectively discriminate against a disproportionate
number of members of a protected class. Id. Accord General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 136-37 (1976) (prima facie case of discrimination established by presenting evidence
of discriminatory effect only); Clady v. Los Angeles County, 770 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir.
1985) ("employee must show facially neutral employment practice produces a significant
adverse impact on a protected class"); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815
(8th Cir. 1983) (court held plaintiff need not prove her relative qualification, only that
employer's act had disproportionate impact against the protected class); Burwell v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 369 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (disparate impact analysis
focuses on consequences of challenged activity), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Kirby v.
Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703 (8th Cir. 1980) (court notes proof of employer's
intent to discriminate not necessary in disparate impact case); Donnell v. General Motors
Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1978) (same). See generally Note, Relative Qualifications
and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII Litigation, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 553, 573 (1982) (discussion
of disparate impact, proof of discriminatory motive or purposeful discrimination not re-
quired under such analysis); Bartholet, supra note 51, at 1210-11.
Generally, a plaintiff may establish disparate impact in one of three ways enunciated in
the following framework: (1) whether the protected class in a specified geographic area is
excluded by the employment practice at a substantially higher rate; (2) whether the per-
centage of class member employees who are actually excluded by the employment practice
is higher than the percentage of non-class members; (3) whether the level of employment
of the protected class by the employer is lower than the percentage of the protected class
in the relevant labor market or geographic area. See Green v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co.,
523 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1975); Brief for Appellees at 3, Chambers (No. 86-1447).
Kirby, 613 F.2d at 703. "The touchstone [of the rationalization] is business necessity..
Id. (quoting Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 583 (1978)). To estab-
lish a business necessity, the employer must demonstrate that the practice is "necessary to
safe and efficient job performance." Id. See United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972) (same standard applied as directed by Supreme
Court in Furnco). Compare Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (employer must show that "any given
requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question") with Hawkins,
697 F.2d at 815 (subjective, conclusory testimony by company personnel not sufficient in
itself to establish business necessity) and EEOC v. Rath Paking Co., 787 F.2d 318, 332 (8th
Cir. 1986) (business necessity addressed by "concrete and demonstrable" facts, not just
perceptions).
The business necessity defense is wholly separate and distinct from the BFOQ justifica-
tion; the BFOQ is statutorily based and is raised in the context of disparate treatment
analysis. See Note, Business Necessity in Title VII: Importing An Employment Discrimination Doc-
trine Into The Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 569 (1986). The BFOQ is more
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Additionally, an employer will be estopped from asserting that it
had a justified business practice if there exists a "nondiscrimina-
tory alternative means of determining qualification.""
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc.
A. Analytical Errors in Chambers
Chamber's discharge, solely on account of her pregnancy," con-
stituted intentional discrimination within the meaning of the
PDA."' Absent a BFOQ, the pregnancy based distinction must be
rejected by the court.57 The court of appeals found a BFOQ had
been established solely on the basis of personal beliefs and as-
sumptions of the Club's board members." It is asserted that
where an employer fails to produce objective evidence to substan-
tiate claims that a discriminatory employment practice is related
and necessary to the accomplishment of the employer's objectives,
that employer has failed to meet his burden of proof and the em-
narrowly construed than the business necessity defense. Note, Business Necessity: Judicial
Dualism and the Searchfor Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376, 382-84 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter,Judicial Dualism]. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). See also Hayes v.
Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1553 (11 th Cir. 1984) (adoption of least discrimi-
natory policy mandated); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir.
1982) (plaintiff prevails where court satisfied employer failed to use least discriminatory
practice available). Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (bur-
den on employee to establish less discriminatory alternative exists) with Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (burden on employer to disprove existence of less
discriminatory alternative), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
" See Jenkins, Judicial Activism and Constitutional Government, 29 AM. J. JuRIs. 169 (1984)
(judges cannot deal with neglected social wrongs because courts of law not proper forums
for policy-oriented decisions); Linder, How Judges Judge: A Study of Disagreement on United
States Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit, 38 ARK. L. REv. 479, 489 (1985). "Subjective values
of judges and information about the world as it exists outside of the case are irrelevant."
Id.
" Chambers, 834 F.2d at 703.
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. See also Holthous v. Compton & Sons,
Inc., 514 F.2d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1975) (even prior to enactment of PDA, prima facie
violation of Title VII was found where employer discharged employee solely because of
pregnancy).
s See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussion of BFOQ).
See Chambers, 834 F.2d at 701. "The Girls Club established that it honestly believed
that to permit single pregnant staff members to work with the girls would convey the im-
pression that the [Girl's Club) condoned [such behavior]." Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 950.
Note, however, that "[nleither an employer's sincere belief, without more, (nor a district
court's belief) that a discriminatory employment practice is related and necessary to the
accomplishments of the employer's goals is sufficient." Chambers, 834 F.2d at 708 (McMil-
lian, J., dissenting).
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ployee must prevail.5
It is submitted that the court of appeals erred in its affirmance
of the district court's application of the McDonnell Douglas analy-
sis. As previously stated, the district court held that Chambers was
discharged because of her pregnancy. 0 Such a holding of per se
sex discrimination is not subject to the McDonnell Douglas analy-
sis.' Rather, the employer must establish a BFOQ.6 As this Com-
ment has asserted, the evidence propounded by the Club did not
establish a BFOQ, thereby precluding the use of such justification
by the Club."
It is suggested that the Chambers court erred in its procedural
application of the impact analysis to the sex discrimination claim.
The Club raised the business necessity defense to refute Cham-
ber's race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.4 None-
theless, both the district court and circuit court addressed the
business necessity defense with reference to both the race discrim-
ination and sex discrimination claims. 5 The BFOQ justification
and business necessity defense have mutually exclusive evidentiary
foundations and thus are not the proper subjects of consolidation
by the court.6
" Chambers, 834 F.2d at 708.
" See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
" See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1985) (McDonnell
Douglas test misplaced where purposeful discrimination is found); Carney v. Martin Luther
Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1987) (when per se discrimination found, inquiry
turns to existence of BFOQ); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079,
1086 n.8 (8th Cir.) (overt discriminatory employment policies violate Title VII absent
BFOQ), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
61 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (West 1981). Where the McDonnell Douglas analysis becomes
inoperative, the issue of "pretextual" motivation becomes irrelevant. See Carney, 824 F.2d
at 648.
63 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Chambers, 834 F.2d 697. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,
459 (1975) (section 1981 commonly used to redress racial discrimination in employment);
see, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 329 U.S. 409, 423 (1968) (private racial discrimination
in rental and sale of property prohibited).
" Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 932, 943. The district court found that the evidence estab-
lished a statistical disproportionate impact on Chambers as a black woman. Id. at 933. The
business necessity defense is addressed where disparate impact is shown. Id. at 949. There-
fore, the business necessity defense rebutted a showing of racially based discrimination pur-
suant to section 1981. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 53, at 385 (business necessity defense
can only be applied to facially neutral rules).




B. The Ramifications of a Policy-Oriented Decision
It has been suggested in this Comment that the Chambers court
premised its holding on a tenuous foundation of evidence in an
effort to reach a verdict which would promote a desired policy
orientation. 7 The appropriateness of such activity by the judicial
body remains the subject of heated debate among this nation's
leading commentators on the function of the judge in the Ameri-
can adversarial system. 8
The inquiry concerning the presence of a BFOQ justification or
a business necessity defense, with reference to a sociological the-
ory of role emulation, does not lend itself to the traditional meth-
ods of establishing such a defense.6 ' It is in this context that judi-
cial policy-making becomes relevant." It is suggested that the
Chambers court sought to refrain from inhibiting the efforts of or-
ganizations, such as the Omaha Girls Club, whose activities have
attempted to ameliorate the problem of teenage pregnancy. This
Comment suggests, however, that in pursuing this exemplary ob-
jective, the court opened the door to intentional discriminatory
employment practices based on the status of pregnancy, a policy
directly in conflict with the intent of Congress and violative of the
" See supra note 34 and accompanying text. While the Chambers court may have sought
to protect the continued efforts of such organizations as the OGC, the court failed to antic-
ipate the consequences of a decision which allows an employer to inflict purposeful discrim-
ination on his employees absent empirical evidence that such a policy is viable. Brief for
Appellants at 37, Chambers (No. 86-1447).
See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 55 (1962) (judge's perspective
goes beyond the particular and judgments are made within societal interest framework);
Johnson, Judicial Activism Is A Duty-Not an Intrusion, in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 279 (1985)
(judge's function necessitates use of interpretive powers). But see United States v. Turkish,
623 F.2d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 1980) (judge performs best when exercising complete impartial-
ity); Inglett & Co. v. Everglades Fertilizer Co., 255 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1958) ("adver-
sary properly functioning when judge's role is sharply separated").
'9 See Brief for Appellees at 13-15, Chambers (No. 86-1447) ("[t]he impact of a role
model is not quantifiable[;] . . . [slociological phenomena is not empirical data and cannot
be treated as such").
"0 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (footnote
four established framework for use of "judicial scrutiny under Fourteenth Amendment").
See also Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term - Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92
HARV. L. REV. 5, 15 (1978) (beyond dispute intervention, court involves itself in "merits of
policy or ethical judgment"); Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979) ("theory of legislative failure" derived from footnote
four "identify[ing] occasions for a strong independent use of judicial power").
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PDA."1 It is suggested that employers who simply profess their
"belief" that pregnant women pose a threat to their business
"objectives," will enjoy the protection of this court's holding. In
resorting to a policy-oriented decision, the court's tacit acceptance
of a subjective foundation of evidence failed to acknowledge the
demand for bare "objectivity" in decision-making.1
IV. CONCLUSION
The above analysis of the Chambers decision reveals the opera-
tional framework within which the PDA operates as a function of
Title VII. The overriding theme inherent in this discussion is the
mandate barring discriminatory employment practices. Absent a
BFOQ where discriminatory treatment is shown, or a business ne-
cessity where discriminatory impact is shown, an employer may
not discriminate against an employee based on the status of
pregnancy.
When faced with a discriminatory practice, it is the function of
the court to examine the objective evidence set before it. Where
such evidence is not readily available, the court may exercise its
policy-making function. This Comment has suggested that the
Chambers court, in exercising its prerogative to employ its policy-
making function, failed to consider the ramifications of its deci-
sion, specifically, that an employer may now discriminate against
an employee solely on the basis of pregnancy, without fear of lia-
bility under the PDA.
Patricia K. Hart
" See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussion of legislative history of PDA).
"' See Fiss, supra note 70, at 24. "He must be impartial, distant and detached... thereby
increasing the likelihood that his decision will not be an expression of self interest ... ." Id.
at 14.
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